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Abstract 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
A substantial amount of the literature has reported on the impact of access to credit on   
technology adoption, and many studies find that credit has a positive impact on adoption.  
However, most existing studies have failed to explicitly measure and analyze the amount of 
credit that farm households are able to borrow and whether they are credit constrained or 
not. They overlooked the fact that credit access can be a panacea for non-adoption only if it 
is targeted at households that face binding liquidity constraints.  Guided by the frame work 
of a household model under credit market failure, this paper aims at investigating the impact 
of access to credit on the adoption of hybrid maize among households that vary in their 
credit constraints. The data used in the study is from Malawi collected by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).Using the direct elicitation approach, households are 
classified into constrained and unconstrained regimes. We start by estimating the probability 
of being credit constrained, followed by an estimation of the impact of access to credit for 
the two categories of households (credit constrained and unconstrained), while accounting 
for selection bias. The impact of access to credit is estimated using a switching regression in 
a Double-Hurdle model. Results reveal that while access to credit increases adoption among 
credit constrained households, it has no effect among unconstrained households. Results 
also show that factors that affect adoption among credit constrained households are 
different from those that that affect adoption among unconstrained household. Landholding 
size, for example, has opposite effects on adoption in the two regimes of households. The 
policy implication is that microfinance institutions should consider scaling up their credit 
services to ensure that more households benefit from it, and in so doing maize adoption 
will be enhanced. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Food security in Malawi is mainly defined in relation to the availability of maize, the 
main staple in the country. It is for this reason that the Malawi’s agricultural policy for the 
past two decades, emphasized the production of hybrid maize, a capital intensive and high 
yielding technology as a substitute to the local maize varieties. Efforts to diversify away from 
maize into other food crops have failed largely because maize being a C4 plant produces 
more calories per unit of land area than all other food crops grown in Malawi. It is therefore, 
likely that Malawi will continue to rely on maize as a major food crop. In addition the policy 
emphasis has been on tobacco, a labor and capital intensive cash crop. A combination of the 
two crops continues to be seen as a potential option for improving the income and food 
security of rural households in Malawi (Zeller et al., 1998). 
The provision of micro-credit to farmers is widely perceived as an effective strategy  
for promoting the adoption of improved technologies. It is believed that access to credit 
promotes the adoption of risky technologies through the relaxation of the liquidity 
constraint as well as through the boosting of household’s-risk bearing ability. With an option 
of borrowing, a household can do away with risk reducing but inefficient income 
diversification strategies and concentrate on more risky but efficient investments (Eswaran 
and Kotwal, 1990).  
Recognizing the potential contribution of credit in enhancing the adoption of hybrid 
maize among smallholders, the government of Malawi has been pursuing a credit policy that 
seeks to promote hybrid maize production. The government of Malawi, through the 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA), started providing joint liability loans 
to smallholder farmers as far back as 1973, three years before the Grameen Bank was created 
(Diagne, et al., 2000).  The credit whose main purpose was to promote smallholders’ 
production of high value crops (first maize, then later in the 1990s also tobacco) was mainly 
given to farmers in the form of in-kind loans such as fertilizer and seed. However, despite 
such concerted efforts by the government, and more recently non-governmental 
organizations in promoting the cultivation of hybrid maize, its adoption remains low. By 
2003, more than half of the total maize land was allocated to local varieties (GOM, 2004).  
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It is often asserted that in addition to taste preferences an on-farm storage constraints 
(Smale, 1995), and to risk aversion (Simtowe et al, 2006), credit constraints are widely 
responsible for the low adoption of hybrid maize due to its requirements for costly inputs. 
A substantial amount of adoption literature has reported on the impact of access to 
credit on adoption, and a good deal of it showing that credit has a positive impact on 
adoption. For, example, Feder and Umali (1993) and Cornejo and McBrid (2002) review 
factors that affect technology adoption, and they highlight access to credit as a key 
determinant of adoption of most agricultural innovations.  Nevertheless, most studies that 
have looked at the impact of credit have generalized their analysis by assuming that credit 
access should always lead to positive impact outcomes. Such studies have ignored household 
behavior with regards to whether or not the household is credit constrained.  In reality, 
however, there are circumstances in which access to credit may have no impact on 
household welfare. Credit access will only be effective for the credit “constrained” – thus 
those with access to remunerative consumption, production and investment opportunities 
who are unable to pursue the opportunities for lack of financial resources. A lack of access 
to credit may not necessarily imply an unmet credit need (de Janvry et al 1997). In the same 
way, the marginal contribution of credit is likely to be high in households that have a larger 
binding credit constraint than in those that are less constrained. Considering separability in 
production decision models is important because the comparative statics for households 
facing a market failure such as credit constraints are different from those without a market 
failure, such that models that do not take into account such differences will lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Vakis et al., 2004). In Malawi, as else where, all credit 
impact studies have not taken into account the potential inconsistency that may result from 
such incorrect modeling.  Knowledge  of whether or not access to credit enables a 
household to make its production and consumption decisions separably is also crucial as it 
enables us to capture other potential constraining factors, such as complementary market 
failures and other factors that might make credit ineffective to beneficiary households.  
Building on the economic theory of the agricultural household model under credit 
market failure, this paper aims at investigating the extent to which access to credit enables 
smallholder farmers to adopt hybrid maize production in Malawi. The study uses a Double-
Hurdle model in estimating the determinants of adoption due to a presumption that factors 
that influence the household’s decision to adopt are different from those that affect the 
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extent of adoption.  Using the direct elicitation approach developed by Diagne, Zeller 
Sharma (200), households are classified into credit constrained and unconstrained regimes. 
The effect of access to credit on the adoption of hybrid maize is estimated using a switching 
regression approach by taking into account the selection bias associated with categorizing the 
sample into constrained and unconstrained regimes. We start by estimating the probability of 
being credit constrained, followed by an estimation of the impact of access to credit for the 
two regimes of households (credit constrained and unconstrained), while accounting for 
selection bias. Data used in this study is from Malawi collected by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: in section two 
we present a review of maize production in Malawi and the role of credit. In section three 
we present the theoretical framework while the empirical approach used is presented in 
section four. The data used for the estimation is described in section five. In section six we 
present and discuss results, while section seven concludes.    
 
2.0 Maize production in Malawi: a review 
 
A significant feature in Malawi´s agriculture is the dominance of maize in the farming 
systems. It is estimated that more than 70 percent of the arable land is allocated to maize 
production (Government of Malawi, 2004). It is also noted that despite efforts to diversify 
away from maize, the land allocated to maize continues to rise.  Carr (1997) notes that the 
continued rise in the land allocated to maize could be attributed to the fact that maize is a C4 
plant, such that it produces more calories per unit land area than other crops grown in 
Malawi. With the decline in farm size, small holders have allocated more of their land to 
maize.  Nevertheless due to the short and single farming season, combined with the lack of 
inputs that accompany the production of maize, yields of maize remain low leading to food 
insecurity for more than 60 percent of the households who run out of food 4 months before 
the next harvest(World bank, 1996). The natural response by the government of Malawi has 
been the introduction of hybrid maize suited for both the climate and food preferences of 
farmers. Due to the continuous decline in soil fertility, farmers developed special interest in 
the use of fertilizer such that by 1995 over 90 percent of the maize was fertilized (CIMMYT, 
1995).  
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 As a way of achieving the policy of intensifying maize production through the use of 
hybrid maize seed and fertilizer, the government embarked on an ambitious credit program 
based on joint liability lending. Agricultural extension officers were given a task of 
overseeing the functioning of the credit groups and monitoring loan repayment. Supported 
by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the ruling party at that time, Conroy (1992) notes that 
this exerted pressure on farmers to repay, enabling Malawi to register the highest repayment 
rates of 95 percent for a number of years. In his paper “a green revolution frustrated” Carr 
(1997) notes that the rapid increase in hybrid maize seed and fertilizer use which was 
encouraged by a sharp rise in the supply of credit to smallholder farmers led a number of 
observers in the World Bank and CYMMT to refer to developments in Malawi as being a 
Green Revolution. In her paper “Maize is Life: Malawi’s delayed Green revolution”, Smale 
(1995) expected that there would be a continued increase in both the area allocated to hybrid 
maize as well as the yield. The reality though is that the land allocated to hybrid maize 
remains low.  
Figure 1: Share of maize  land allocated to hybrid maize production
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Period in years
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 (
%
)
 
Figure 1 presents the trend in the share of land allocated to hybrid maize from 1984 to 2003. 
Although there is appositive trend in land allocated to hybrid maize (as shown by the 
increase from about 8 percent in 1984 to 30 percent in 2003), there has been a number of 
fluctuations resulting from both policy influences as well as natural disasters such as drought. 
The steady increase in the share of hybrid maize area was halted in 1994 when it fell to 18 
percent due to the collapse of the Small holder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA). 
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Zeller et al (1998) note that, while 400,000 farmers received credit in 1992 only 34,000 did so 
in 1994. This led to an increase in the share of small holder land area planted to non-maize 
crops such as cassava and pulses. Zeller et al (1998) observe that the response of farmers to 
the perceived advantages of drought-resistant crops, the sudden collapse of the public 
system for distributing credit for maize production, and the government policy orientation 
towards diversifying smallholder crop production may all have played a role in this outcome. 
Nevertheless, the increasing trend picked up after 1994 due to the large scale distribution of 
free fertilizer and hybrid maize seed. A sharp fall was experienced in 2001 and 2002 but 2003 
saw a recovery to 30 percent of the land allocated to hybrid maize. From the review it is 
clear that more has to be done if the government policy of expanding the production of 
hybrid maize to more than half of the total maize land area is to be achieved. A research on 
the role of credit on adoption of hybrid maize which takes into account the household credit 
constraint status is pertinent in that it will inform credit policy makers on the type of farmers 
to target for credit (or on the role of credit in fostering hybrid maize production).    
 
3.0 Theoretical framework 
  
Static household models that stress the role of pervasive risks, limited information, 
and imperfect markets on household’s behavior have been widely used. Singh et al. (1986) 
note that predictions derived from these models differ markedly from those under a 
standard household model where separability between production and consumption 
decisions is assumed. Under separability, allocation of resources in production can be 
decided independently of consumption decisions. However, separability breaks down when 
there is a market failure such that production and consumption decisions need to be taken 
jointly. In agricultural production, expenditure and income profiles are markedly seasonal 
and thus the liquidity constraints in financing production and consumption can be 
particularly acute (de Janvry et al., 1999). This prompts households to adjust their income 
generating strategies and their expenditure patterns to bring the distance between the two 
profiles within the range of available credit.  
Thus in this study we assume a static household model that links adoption of 
improved technologies with a growing season liquidity constraint. It is assumed that a 
household chooses between growing a local maize variety (lm) that is not subject to the 
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growing season liquidity constraint and hybrid maize (hm) which is subject to the growing 
season liquidity constraint.  The household is assumed to be maximizing the following utility 
function: 
 
);,,,(
,,,,,,
h
lmlmhm
ccccqllqq
zccccUMax
lmlmhmxhmhmlmlmhm
      (1) 
 
where:  
 U is the utility function to be maximized, 
mlmhm ccc ,,  and lc  are quantities consumed of hybrid maize, local maize, 
manufactured good, and leisure, respectively. 
hz is a set of household characteristics that influence consumption 
 
Subject to: 
           (2) 
Klwqpqpcpcpcpqp slmlmhmhmlmlmhmhmmmxhmxhm +++=+++ )(     
Seasonal liquidity constraint 
 
);,,,,,( qxhmhmlmlmhm zqllqqg =0     production function 
 
,Eclll lhmlms =+++       time constraint 
where: 
lmhm qq ,  are quantities of hybrid maize and local maize produced , respectively   
lml , hml  and sl  are quantities of labor used in the production of local maize, hybrid 
maize, and labor sold out by the household, respectively 
xhmq is the quantity of extra inputs required for the production of hybrid maize, such 
as improved seed, pesticides, etc, 
qZ is a set of fixed factors in production and farm household specific characteristics 
that influence production, 
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xhmp  and w  are  input prices for inputs specific to hybrid maize and the wage rate 
on the labor market, respectively, 
hmp  and  lmp  are farm gate prices for hybrid maize and local maize. 
mp is the price for the manufactured good,  
E is the total time endowment, 
K is the liquidity from past savings, credit, and pre-harvest transfers. 
 
In peasant economies with rare opportunities for off farm income, maximizing the 
consumption function is closely associated with maximizing farm profits which are then 
used to finance the consumption decisions. In this case it means maximizing profits from 
the production of hybrid maize and local maize. The maximization problem above yields the 
following Lagrangean function: 
 
);,,,( hlmlmhm zccccUL =             (3) 
+ −+++ Klwqpqp slmlmhmhm )({1λ }lmlmhmhmmmxhmxhm cpcpcpqp −−−  
         + );,,,,,((2
q
xhmhmlmlmhm zqllqqgλ + )(3 lhmlms clllE −−−−λ  
 
Assuming an interior solution, the maximization problems yields the following first order 
conditions: 
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 1λ  is a multiplier associated with the credit constraint. The multiplier represents an 
additional amount of inputs for the production of hybrid maize ( xhmq ) that a farmer will 
purchase for each additional unit of cash or credit. This is valid only when the farmer fails to 
acquire optimum inputs required due to lack of cash. Thus it is only relevant to credit or 
liquidity constrained households. For unconstrained households the multiplier does not have 
an effect on their production decision. There are, therefore, two scenarios depending on 
whether the credit constraint is binding or not. First, we consider a case where there is no 
binding constraint on the amount which the household can borrow.  Thus the credit 
constraint is not binding and therefore, 01 =λ . Under this scenario, the first order 
conditions for the optimum input requirements are given as follows: 
 
xhmxhm
xhm
pq
q
L
−=
∂
∂
2λ =0        (11) 
The optimum quantity of input  xhmq  is given by: 
 
xhm
uq = ),,,,( Ezpppq qxhmlmhmxhm
u        (12) 
 
The superscript u refers to the unconstrained case. 
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In the second scenario we have a household that can not borrow as much as it wants. The 
household is said to face a credit constraint )0( 1 >λ . The first order Kuhn Tucker 
conditions under such a scenario are still based on the same objectives function (..) except 
that in this case the amount of credit  K, is treated as one of the parameters that is 
exogenously determined by the lender. The first order conditions for  the interior solution 
are :  
 
0)1( 12 =+−=∂
∂
λλ xhmxhm
xhm
pq
q
L
, 01 >λ       (13) 
 
 
Since the constraint is binding we must solve the optimum quantities of xhmq  and 1λ as 
follows: 
 
xhm
cq = ),,,,,( KEzpppq qxhmlmhmxhm
c       (14) 
The superscript c  refers to the constrained case. 
 
The difference between the two (constrained and constrained) is that in the constrained case 
farmers are unable to buy optimal quantities of hybrid maize input xhmq .  The amount of 
credit therefore becomes an important determinant of the farmer’s ability to adopt hybrid 
maize. The amount demanded for hybrid maize input does not only depend on the prices of 
maize and other inputs but also on the amount of credit (K) available to the household. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested is that while access to credit (K) does not influence 
the adoption decision for the liquidity unconstrained farmers, it does so for the constrained.  
 
4.0 Empirical Model 
 
Our empirical strategy starts by categorizing households into credit constrained and 
unconstrained regimes. The elicitation approach allows us to capture whether or not a 
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household is credit constrained by directly asking the household whether they needed more 
credit for its investment activities. Through a series of questions it is possible to know 
whether or not a household had excess demand (ED) for credit in a given recall period. The 
procedure allows for the treatment of excess demand for credit (ED) =(Demand –Supply), 
as a latent variable for each household h. Following this procedure it is not possible to assess 
the magnitude of the constraint,  instead only an indicator of whether or not the household 
is credit constrained is observed (Gilligan et al., 2005). The specification for the two 
categories of households can thus be written as follows: 
  
1=hk  if 0
'* ≥+= hhh uXED α        (15) 
0=hk  if 0
'* ≤+= hhh uXED α  
Where:  
hX  represents household and farm characteristics that determine credit demand as 
well as characteristics of the household and the lending institution that determine the 
supply of credit 
hu  is a random error term with zero mean capturing stochastic factors affecting both 
the demand and supply 
Based on the theoretical framework presented earlier, the underlying assumption in assessing 
the effect of credit on adoption is  that adoption S is a function of a vector, X  consisting of 
exogenous variables and endogenous credit access, K, such that:   
iKXSS εβ += );,,(
´              (16) 
          
In this specification credit access K is endogenous because factors that affect the 
household’s access to credit K may also affect the household’s share of land allocated to 
hybrid maize. In order to solve this problem Zeller et, al (1998) recommend a simultaneous 
modeling of both the adoption decision and access to credit. As such, an extra equation is 
required to estimate the predicted access to credit, K expressed as  
iwXKK ωγ += );,(
´          (17) 
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The theoretical framework outlined earlier postulates that credit access K  is only an 
important variable for adoption among households that are credit constrained. The adoption 
of hybrid maize by a credit constrained household can thus be specified as follows: 
i
cc KXSS εβ += );,,( ´              (18) 
  3 iwXKK ωγ += );,(
´                (19)  
Where: 
´X is a vector of characteristics that affect both the adoption decision and the 
endogenous credit access, K, 
 w= is a vector of instruments correlated with credit access but not with adoption, 
 1ε  and 2ε are random error terms, where as  
 γβ ,  are vectors of coefficients. 
 
As for the unconstrained households, since it is assumed that credit access does not affect 
their decision to adopt hybrid maize, credit access, K, should have no impact on adoption. 
The specification is as follows: 
η+= );,( vXAS uu          (20) 
 
where: v and η  are a coefficient to be estimated and the error tem, respectively.  The 
estimation of equations for the two regimes, thus the credit constrained regime and the 
unconstrained regime is done using a switching regression approach. Estimating the two 
equations separately is used as a counterfactual test of whether or not credit access affects 
adoption among constrained households. In the empirical estimation we include the 
predicted access to credit as one of the explanatory variables in both regimes. 
 
 
Using equation 15 as a criterion function for whether or not a household is credit 
constrained and S to represent the dependent variable for adoption, we estimate an 
endogenous switching regression model as specified in Maddala, (1986) of the following 
form 
                                                 
3
 Results for this equation are not discussed in this paper but  can be requested from the authors 
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2 += φ  if 0=hk          (21b) 
 
where 
 [ ]ni ββδφ ...., 10=  
 [ ]KXW hih ˆ,´' =  
 iihv ε=  for i=1 if the household is credit constrained and i=2 if unconstrained. 
The endogeneity in a switching regression comes from the fact that we allow for correlation 
between the error terms in the credit constraint criterion function (15) and the equations of 
interest (21a) and (21b). Thus the error terms hhh uandvv ,,, 21 are assumed to be jointly 
normally distributed with zero mean and the following covariance matrix. 
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The switching regression model accounts for the fact that each household has a non-
zero probability of being credit constrained in each period, that this probability varies 
depending on household characteristics, and that only one realization of these probabilities is 
observed in each period (Gillgan et al., 2005). Consistent estimates of parameters 1φ  and 2φ  
can be obtained by following a two step Heckman procedure of estimating the credit 
constraint equation in (15) as a Probit and estimating equation 21a and 21b separately, while 
correcting for the selection bias by including the inverse  Mills ratio from equation 15  as a 
regressor in the two equations.  
 
Following Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985) we define adopters as households that reported 
that they grew hybrid maize. The extent of adoption is defined as degree of use of a 
technology, which for this study is taken as the proportion of maize land that is allocated to 
hybrid maize. The decision of whether or not to adopt hybrid maize variety and how much 
 14 
land to allocate to hybrid maize can be estimated using a censored Tobit model (Zilberman 
and Just 1984) or a P-Tobit model (Deaton and Irish (1984).  However, the main weakness 
with the Tobit model is that it only allows one type of zero observation, namely, a corner 
solution, since it is based on the implicit assumption that zeros arise only as a result of the 
respondent’s economic circumstances (Martínez-Espiñeira, 2006). In the same context 
Moffat (2003) observes that in some cases there are household that would never take some 
positive values, (thus they would never adopt under any circumstances because they consider 
the technology to be inferior), then the use of a restrictive Tobit model without considering 
the group that would never adopt may give biased results. Deaton and Irish (1984) propose a 
relaxation of this restriction by considering the probability that one would never adopt. With 
respect to this study, let us assume that the proportion of households that are potential 
adopters of hybrid maize is p, such that the proportion of households that would never 
adopt hybrid maize is (1-p). The Tobit model would apply for the group of potential 
adopters while it wouldn’t for the “never adopters” since the intensity of adoption would be 
automatically zero. This gave rise to the P-Tobit model with the following likelihood 
function (Moffat 2003): 
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0
iii xyp
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pLogL     (22) 
Thus in addition to estimating β  and δ the P-Tobit also estimates the p .  
   
Nevertheless, as noted by Martínez-Espiñeira (2006), the P-Tobit model fails to analyze the 
factors that will make a respondent more or less likely to adopt a technology. A further 
generalization allows for the parameter p to vary according to respondent’s characteristics. 
This gives rise to the Double-Hurdle model which is an improvement over a P-Tobit. The 
underlying assumption in the Double-Hurdle approach is that individuals make two 
decisions with regard to their willingness to grow hybrid maize. The first decision is whether 
they will allocate a positive amount of land to hybrid maize at all. The second decision is 
about the share of land that they will allocate, conditional on the first decision. The two 
decisions are, therefore, whether to grow hybrid maize and how much to grow. The 
importance of treating the two decisions independently lies in the fact that factors that affect 
one’s decision to adopt may be different from those that affect the decision on how much to 
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adopt. This implies that households must cross two hurdles in order to adopt. The first 
hurdle needs to be crossed in order to be a potential adopter. Given that the households is a 
potential adopter, their current circumstances then dictate whether or not they do in fact 
adopt- this is the ‘second hurdle’ (Moffat 2003). The Double-Hurdle model allows for the 
possibility that these two decisions are affected by a different set of variables. The advantage 
with this approach is that it allows us to understand characteristics of a class of households 
that would never adopt hybrid maize. Thus the probability of a household to belong to a 
particular class depends on a set of household characteristics.  
Originally proposed by Cragg (1971), the Double-Hurdle model has been recently 
applied in a variety of areas. Martínez-Espiñeira (2006) cites the use of the Double -Hurdle 
model by Burton, Dorset and Young´s (1996), who model US food expenditure  away from 
home; Yen and Jones (1997) who apply the model to alcohol consumption and US 
household consumption of cheese, respectively. Moffat (2003) used the model to model loan 
default. The Double-Hurdle model is a parametric generalization of the P-Tobit model in 
which the decision to adopt and the intensity of adoption are determined by two separate 
stochastic processes and therefore, two equations. The first equation in the Double-Hurdle 
relates to the decision to adopt and it can be expressed as follows: 
 
1=id  if 0
* >id  and 0 if 0* ≤id     (23) 
iizd εα += '
*  
id
*  is latent adoption variable that takes the value of 1 if a household grew hybrid maize and 
0 otherwise,  z is a vector of household characteristics and α  is a vector of parameters; 
 
The second hurdle, which closely resembles the Tobit model is expressed as: 
 
         
*
ii yy =  if 0
* >iy and 0
* >id  
         0=iy  otherwise 
         ii uxy += β'
*        (24) 
where iy  is the observed response on how much land one allocated to hybrid maze, x  is a 
vector of the household characteristics and β  is a vector of parameters.  
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The decision of whether or not to adopt hybrid maize and  about how much land to allocate 
to hybrid maize  can be jointly modeled, if they are made simultaneously by the household; 
independently, if the are made separately; or sequentially, if  one is made first and affects the other 
one as in the dominance model (Martínez-Espiñeira, 2006). If the independence model 
applies, the error terms are distributed as follows: 
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If both decisions are made jointly (the Dependent Double - Hurdle) the error term can be 
defined as 
),0(.~) ΥBVNiiµε  where 
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The model is said to be a dependent model if there is a relationship between the decision to 
adopt and the intensity of adoption. This relationship can be expressed as follows: 
)var()var(
)cov(
ii
ii
µε
µε
ρ =          (25) 
if 0=ρ and there is dominance (the zeros are only associated to non-participation, not 
standard corner solutions) then the model decomposes into a Probit for participation and a 
standard OLS for y . 
Following Smith (2003) we assume that the error terms iε  and iµ  are independently and 
normally distributed4 and thus we have the following expression: 
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4
 See Smith (2003) for a theoretical analysis of why there might little gain from modeling dependence  
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And finally, the observed variable in a Double-Hurdle model is 
*
iii ydy =   
 
The log-likelihood function for the double hurdle model is: 
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Empirical results by both Moffat (2003) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2006) reveal that the 
Double-Hurdle model gives superior results to those obtained from Tobit and P-Tobit 
models. Thus in this study we estimate the decision to adopt and the extent of adoption 
using a Double-Hurdle model. 
 
5.0 Data 
 
The data used in this analysis draws from a survey of households conducted by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Department of Rural 
Development at Bunda College of Agriculture in 1996 (for details see Diagne and Zeller 
2001). The survey was conducted in three rounds, however this study used data from the 
first round of the survey. The objective of the IFPRI study was to investigate the effects of 
access to credit on household welfare. The survey covered 404 households selected via 
stratified random sampling method, from the three regions and from 5 districts of Rumphi, 
Nkhotakota, Dowa and Dedza and Mangochi. The survey questionnaire consists of seven 
modules. Only 3 modules were of relevance to this study, namely, household demographics, 
crop and livestock production and credit and savings. The data is available from on request 
from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables included in the adoption model 
differentiated by the adoption status are presented in Table 1.  They include socio-economic 
characteristics such as age, sex and education level of a household head. We also include 
wealth status indicators such as land size, the value of assets, amount of off farm income and 
market access factors (supply related factors) such as credit, distance to markets, and access 
to the extension services.  Our a priori expectation is that wealth proxy variables will have a 
positive effect on the adoption of hybrid maize (Feder et al., 1985). We expect that access to 
credit will increase adoption among credit constrained households through the relaxation of 
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the liquidity constraints. We expect farmers that are close to input and output markets as 
well as close to extension service centers to adopt hybrid maize due to the reduction in 
transaction costs. Descriptive statistics indicate that adopters have high off-farm incomes 
(MK 3050) than non-adopters (MK 2167). At the time of the survey, 1 US-dollar was worth 
44 Malawi Kwacha (MK). There are no marked differences in terms of gender, age and 
education of household head between adopters and non-adopters. However, adopting 
households are significantly (at 5 percent level) larger (4.9 persons) than non adopters (4.3 
persons). It is also observed that adopting households have significantly larger (P<0.05) land 
holdings (1.8 hectares) than non adopters (1.5 hectares). With regards to wealth, adopters are 
wealthier with significantly larger asset values (MK 2762) than the non adopters (MK 1006). 
In addition, adopters have significantly higher levels of access to formal credit than non-
adopting households. A larger proportion of non-adopters (86%) than adopters (50%) rely 
on agriculture as their primary occupation. Other major sources of livelihoods for adopters 
are self employment (10%) and wage employment (15%). 
 
Table 1: Means of selected variables, differentiated by adoption status  
for hybrid maize  
Variable Adopters 
(n=161) 
non-adopters 
(n=243) 
Total 
(n=404) 
Yearly off-farm income (MK) 3050.40 2167.86 2694 
Female- headed (%) 71.4 67.5 70 
Age of household head(years)   45 47 46 
Years of schooling of household head 3.6 2.8 3.3 
Years of schooling of spouse  2.6 2.1 2.4 
Household size  4.9 4.3 4.7 
Number of adult males (15-64 years) 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Number of adult females(15-64 years) 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Land holding size in  hectares  1.8 1.5 1.7 
Number of persons per hectare 
cultivated 
1.4 1.2 1.3 
Credit access (MK/year) 346 232 300 
Percentage of households owning 
livestock  
53 65 58 
Value of assets owned (MK) 2762 1006 2036 
Occupation of household head    
Farming 50 86 65 
Household worker 3 4 3 
Wage laborer 15 3 10 
Trade 10 2 6 
Other self-employment 17 1 11 
Unemployed 1 2 1.2 
Other 4.1 1.5 3.0 
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey 
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6.0 Results and discussions 
 
6.1 Full sample estimates 
 
Table 2 presents results from the double hurdle model of determinants on adoption. In 
addition to credit variables we include other variables that are theoretically linked to 
technology adoption. We estimate three separate equations and observe differences in the 
impact of credit between credit-constrained and unconstrained households. Columns 1 and 
2 present estimates of the adoption model for the full sample of farmers. Results show that 
access to credit has a positive and significant effect on the probability of adoption, while its 
effect on the extent of adoption is not significant. The implication from this finding is that 
access to credit increases the likelihood that a household will potentially adopt hybrid maize 
but conditional on adoption, access to credit does not lead to high levels of adoption. One 
explanation to the insignificant effect of credit on the extent of adoption in the full sample 
could be that the credit provided is not high enough to significantly improve the intensity of 
adoption. This is consistent with the finding by Diagne and Zeller (2001) that the credit 
limits granted by formal lenders in Malawi were relatively small in relation to the amount of 
credit demanded. Zeller and Diagne (2001) therefore recommend to gradually increase loan 
sizes to repeat borrowers. The other explanation could be that not all credit is used for the 
production of hybrid maize which is also confirmed by Diagne and Zeller (2001). 
Nevertheless, the finding that credit significantly increases the likelihood of adoption is 
inline with a priori expectations and in concurrence with findings from a number of studies 
that have shown that the lack of access to credit significantly inhibits the adoption of high 
yielding varieties even when fixed pecuniary costs are not large (Feder et al., 1985). 
 Other than credit, a number of other variables returned significant signs in the 
full sample estimates. The amount of off- farm income had a positive and significant effect 
on the likelihood of adoption but it returned a negative and significant effect on the extent 
of adoption. Theoretically, off-farm income can help to overcome a working capital 
constraint or may even finance the purchase of a fixed investment type of innovation. 
Empirical evidence of similar findings has been reported by Feder et al (1985).  These results 
imply that households with high off-farm income have a higher potential of becoming 
adopters, thus they are more likely to pass through the first hurdle than those with less off-
farm-income. However, conditional on adoption households with high off farm income will 
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allocate smaller portions of land to hybrid production. One reason is that households with 
high off-farm incomes are located in Nkhotakota and Mangochi districts where maize is not 
a prime crop and where households derive most of their livelihoods from fishing in the lake 
or fish selling such that the amount of off-farm income earned is not reinvested into hybrid 
maize production.  The average off-farm incomes for Nkhotakota and Mangochi were  
MK 5808 and MK 4440, respectively. These incomes were twice as high as the average  
off-farm income for the sample of MK 2600.   
 Regarding the age of the household head, results indicate that it has a negative 
and significant effect on the probability of adoption. The age of household head had no 
effect on the extent of adoption. Old age happens to be one of the human capital 
characteristics that have been frequently associated with non-adoption in most adoption 
studies. Among the several reasons that could explain the negative effect of age on adoption 
is the fact that older farmers have a tendency to stick to their old production techniques and 
that they are usually unwilling to accept change. In addition young people are associated with 
a higher risk taking behavior than the elderly. At the time of the survey, more than 60 
percent of the heads of households were more than 40 years old. 
 The size of a household has a positive and significant effect on the probability 
of adoption. However, it has a negative and significant effect on the extent of adoption for 
hybrid maize. The positive effect on the probability of adoption can be explained by the fact 
that labor is an important input in the production of maize and therefore, larger households 
have abundant labor required for maize production.  The negative effect of household size 
on the extent of adoption can be explained by the fact that once the decision to grow hybrid 
maize is made based on abundant labor available, the extent of adoption will depend on the 
ability of the household to finance the purchase of inputs required for the cultivation of 
hybrid maize. This is particularly true because hybrid maize requires more capital for the 
purchase of fertilizer and seed than it requires labor because it is not labor intensive.
 Households that received free inputs in form of fertilizer and seed were more 
likely to adopt hybrid maize than those that did not but conditional on adoption, free inputs 
had no effects on the extent of adoption. This can be explained by the fact that the amount 
of free inputs distributed in form of fertilizer and seed are usually the same across 
households and that they are usually enough for the cultivation of very small portions of 
land of about 0.25 acres.  
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Table 2: Determinants of adoption – Double-Hurdle model estimates 
 Pooled of full sample 
(n=404) 
Credit Constrained 
(n=223) 
Credit unconstrained 
(n=181) 
 First hurdle Second 
hurdle 
 
First hurdle Second 
hurdle 
First hurdle Second 
hurdle 
 Coefficient 
(std.Errors) 
Coefficient 
(std.Errors) 
Coefficient 
(std.Errors) 
Coefficient 
(std.Errors) 
Coefficient 
(std.Errors) 
Coefficient 
(std.Errors) 
Off farm income 0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0024*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Gender (1=male) -0.1048 
(0.2463) 
0.4032 
(4.6639) 
-0.5364 
(0.4079) 
6.7265 
(5.3282) 
-0.8836 
(0.6020) 
18.5642** 
(7.7599) 
Age household head -0.0148* 
(0.0076) 
-0.2382 
(0.1455) 
-0.0131 
(0.0176) 
-0.4992** 
(0.2389) 
-0.0039 
(0.0143) 
-0.3825* 
(0.2036) 
Assetvalue 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008 
(0.0008) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Household size 0.2684*** 
(0.0732) 
-3.0063** 
(1.3570) 
0.3866*** 
(0.1266) 
-2.8244 
(2.0886) 
0.1470 
(0.1645) 
-3.8909*** 
(1.1912) 
Total land holding -0.0419 
(0.1119) 
-1.6460 
(1.4963) 
-0.4282** 
(0.2108) 
0.0544 
(2.8510) 
0.8746*** 
(0.2307) 
-2.2721** 
(1.1093) 
Education head 0.0466 
(0.2157) 
-1.3151 
(5.3272) 
-0.2748 
(0.5051) 
-0.6274 
(7.3753) 
-0.7890 
(0.5566) 
-9.6408* 
(5.0293) 
Free inputs 0.9796** 
(0.3832) 
3.2644 
(3.7366) 
0.6274 
(0.8003) 
12.7164*** 
(4.3385) 
1.0161 
(0.8043) 
-13.3996** 
(6.2884) 
Tobacco growing 
household 
-0.0586 
(0.3450) 
-6.3529 
(6.7016) 
0.9890 
(0.7466) 
-5.4611 
(12.6465) 
-1.0685** 
(0.4776) 
6.0363 
(5.3914) 
Distance to extension 
office 
-0.0116 
(0.0411) 
1.4238 
(1.1182) 
-0.3370** 
(0.1564) 
1.0640 
(2.4644) 
0.0425 
(0.0951) 
1.1292 
(0.8765) 
Distance to market -0.0023 
(0.0250) 
0.5269 
(0.5717) 
-0.0855 
(0.0696) 
0.3529 
(0.4953) 
0.0304 
(0.0628) 
1.2907** 
(0.5407) 
Formal credit 0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0016 
(0.0020) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0334*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0013 
(0.0012) 
Informal credit -0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0019 
(0.0059) 
0.0000 
(0.0014) 
0.0017 
(0.0106) 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0040 
(0.0038) 
Land pressure -0.2389*** 
(0.0554) 
4.5916*** 
(1.5095) 
-0.3476*** 
(0.1146) 
5.7717*** 
(2.1543) 
-0.1953* 
(0.1135) 
3.9224** 
(1.7802) 
Mangochi 1.6047*** 
(0.4126) 
17.3987** 
(8.6653) 
-0.3120 
(0.8298) 
21.2384* 
(10.9443) 
2.7333** 
(1.1144) 
20.2055** 
(8.3566) 
Nkhota 0.5178 
(0.5400) 
-5.1923 
(11.2355) 
-2.1100* 
(1.2297) 
2.4047 
(13.0428) 
1.1728 
(1.1626) 
20.8476* 
(12.1804) 
Rumphi 0.5078 
(0.6550) 
-7.4643 
(11.4892) 
-0.4602 
(2.2966) 
-20.3768 
(18.6330) 
4.0824** 
(1.7858) 
4.4304 
(11.186) 
Dedza -0.7269** 
(0.2986) 
-20.7612** 
9.4830) 
2.2634 
(1.4331) 
-60.8863*** 
(11.5352) 
0.5016 
(0.5316) 
-17.5358** 
(7.6329) 
Lambda 
  
-1.2139** 
(0.6084) 
10.3686 
(15.4296) 
1.4480*** 
(0.3624) 
-7.9923** 
(3.1410) 
_cons 0.0404 
(0.6098) 
48.5584*** 
(15.6481) 
3.2837* 
(1.9231) 
46.3980** 
(19.5353) 
-3.0855** 
(1.4051) 
53.7061*** 
(19.5569) 
/lnsigma 
 
3.18238*** 
(0.0574) 
 3.17436*** 
(0.0710) 
 2.8668*** 
(0.07489) 
Sigma  24.1040*** 
 (1.3842)  
 23.91169*** 
(1.6260) 
 17.58148 
(1.3168) 
No. of obs  404  223  181 
Chi-square  112.31***  208***  120.22*** 
LL-function  -1152.109  -609.131  -532.6219 
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI  Rural Finance Survey 
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 Land pressure, which is measured as the number of persons per hectare has a 
negative and significant effect on the probability of adoption, but conditional on adoption 
households with more individuals per hectare allocate more land to hybrid maize. 
Experience has shown that households with high land pressure are also likely to be poor 
households hence less likely to finance the purchase of costly innovations. However, upon 
surpassing the first hurdle, households with high land pressure will intensify their adoption 
of an improved variety to maximize productivity required to meet their food and cash 
requirements from the small size of land. In most adoption literature, high land pressure has 
been described as a prerequisite for agricultural intensification. Results indicate that 
households in Mangochi and Dedza are more likely to allocate larger portions of land to 
hybrid maize than households from other districts. The remain explanatory variables such as 
gender, education, land holding as well as markets access variables such as distance to market 
and distance to extension office were not significant in the full sample estimates.  
 
6.2 Constrained versus unconstrained households 
 
 Columns 3-4 and columns 5-6 present estimates of the switching regression model 
for the credit constrained and credit unconstrained households, respectively.5 Results from 
the credit constrained regime in columns 3 and 4 indicate that credit has a positive and 
significant effect on the extent of adoption of hybrid maize but it had no effect on the 
likelihood of adoption.  The implication from these findings is that once credit constrained 
households decide to adopt hybrid maize, credit significantly increases their ability to finance 
the purchase of inputs required for the production of hybrid maize which leads to an 
expansion of the area under hybrid maize. Therefore, conditional on adoption, credit 
constrained households with higher amounts of credit allocate more land to hybrid maize 
production. In the study area in particular, formal credit is provided for the production of 
tobacco as well as for off-farm employment activities.  
 In concurrence with the null hypothesis that credit will have no effect on the 
adoption of hybrid maize among unconstrained households, results in  columns 5 and 6 
                                                 
5
 The results for the switching regression model are estimated using a Heckman selection model to estimate 
parameters in each regime while adjusting standard errors accordingly. Estimates of the first stage Probit 
model on credit constraints were presented earlier. 
 23 
reveal that indeed credit had no effect on both the likelihood of a adoption as well as the 
extent of adoption in the unconstrained regime. The value of assets which was used as a 
proxy for household wealth had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of 
adoption in the credit constrained regime but it had no effect on the likelihood of adoption 
in the unconstrained regime. Land holding size reduces the likelihood of adoption in the 
credit constrained regime while it increases the likelihood of adoption in the unconstrained 
regime. This is not a surprising finding because as observed by Weil (1970) the negative 
relationship between adoption and land holding size may be caused by credit constraints. 
Weil suggests that capital may be more available for larger farms, so that even though all 
farms may wish to adopt, larger farms are more likely to do so.  Thus, households with larger 
holdings are also likely to be wealthier, with increased ability for self financing the 
purchasing of inputs but when such households are credit constrained then their adoption 
rate is negatively affected. The negative effect of land holding on the extent of adoption inn 
the unconstrained regime implies that smaller farmers exhibit higher intensities of hybrid 
maize adoption than larger farms. Feder et al. (1975) suggested that the phenomenon may 
arise because small farms will farm land more intensively to meet subsistence needs 
 The gender of household head was significant only in the unconstrained regime. 
Thus male headed households that were not credit constrained allocated larger proportions 
of their land to hybrid maize cultivation than female headed households. Of interest in the 
unconstrained regime is the fact that while land holding increases the likelihood of adoption, 
it negatively affects the extent of adoption.  While the land allocated to tobacco was 
insignificant in the constrained regime, results show that tobacco growing households that 
are unconstrained are less likely to grow hybrid maize. Free input distribution among 
unconstrained households does not necessarily translate into increased hybrid maize 
production. The main reason is that the majority of unconstrained households that received 
free inputs were from Mangochi and Nkhotakota where maize farming is not popular. 
Hence, because of such mistargeting of credit to on average wealthier households, the 
expected effects on hybrid maize adoption and production were not materializing.   
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7.0 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The current policy emphasis on credit as a development tool coupled with the 
limited availability of funds for credit implies that targeting credit to those that really need it 
has become a crucial issue.  In addition, it is theoretically expected that credit provided at 
market interest rate results into marginal benefits among credit constrained households but 
does no welfare enhancement for unconstrained households. Therefore, achieving high 
economic efficiency in credit allocation requires targeting credit constrained households. 
This paper has investigated the impact of access to credit among households that differ in 
their credit constraint status. Using a switching regression approach we investigated 
determinants of adoption of hybrid maize using a Double-Hurdle model due to a hypothesis 
that factors that affect the decision to adopt hybrid maize may be different from those that 
influence the extent of adoption.    
Results reveal that factors that influence the decision to adopt hybrid maize are not 
necessarily the same factors that affect the extent of adoption. Results also indicate that 
factors that affect adoption decisions among credit constrained households are different 
from those that affect adoption in the unconstrained regime. For, example, while credit had 
a positive effect on adoption in the constrained regime, it had no effect among 
unconstrained households. The effect of land size on adoption is another example of 
variables with an opposite effect between the two regimes. Results indicated that while larger 
land holdings lead to increased adoption among the unconstrained regime, it has a negative 
effect on adoption in the constrained regime probably due to credit constraints. An 
interesting lesson from this study is that it is important to consider the two stages of 
adoption separately when assessing strategies for promoting agricultural technologies 
because factors that affect the decision to adopt are different from those that affect the 
decision on the extent of adoption. 
The fact that credit access had a higher impact on the adoption of hybrid maize 
among credit constrained households justifies the need for credit targeting to achieve high 
economic efficiency.  Second, most of the formal credit from formal credit institutions in 
Malawi to rural households is in the form of in-kind credit, namely fertilizer and seeds 
either for hybrid maize and tobacco. Our results show that – unless such credit is 
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provided to credit-constrained households – the current practice of loan delivery aimed at 
increasing hybrid maize production fails to achieve the objective of increasing hybrid 
maize share. Farm households receiving such in-kind credit simply at best substitute own 
financing for credit, or worse, they will on-sell the hybrid maize seed and fertilizer 
presumably at a loss, or use it for other crops. In any case, formal credit institutions in 
Malawi may reconsider the practice of in-kind loans, considering that the net welfare 
benefit of cash credit for rural farm households with multiple sources of income, 
investment and consumption opportunities is likely to be higher than the one generated 
by in-kind credit.  
Third, our results indicate that although credit access increases the likelihood of 
adoption, it does not influence the extent of hybrid maize area cultivated. This indicates 
that loan sizes may be too small for making a significant impact on the cultivated area. 
The formal institutions may reconsider their practice of giving standardized loan sizes, 
and adopt a more demand-oriented flexible policy that rewards repeat borrowers with 
impeccular repayment records with gradually increasing larger loans. Among hybrid 
maize farmers, this change in policy is likely to increase the area of hybrid maize grown 
in Malawi. Fourth, only less than 6 percent of smallholders in Malawi have currently 
access to credit. Expanding the existing rural credit system to more smallholders will be 
crucial for fostering the adoption of higher-value food and cash crops, such as hybrid 
maize.  
Last, poverty in rural Malawi is widespread and deep. The poorest of the poor 
among rural farm households need to be targeted through safety net schemes – not credit- 
in order to enable these households to adopt higher value crops while ensuring food 
security after droughts or other natural disasters. Hence, credit is only of relevance to a 
smaller set of rural households in Malawi. Other constraints, such as extreme 
vulnerability and poverty, or lack of market access and road infrastructure, need to be 
addressed by other policy instruments.  
 
. 
 
 
 26 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adesina, A., and Baidu-Forson, A. (1995) Farmers´ perception and adoption of new 
agricultural technology: Evidence from analysis in Burkina Faso and Guinea, West 
Africa Agricultural economics 13:1-9. 
Cornejo, J., and McBride,W. 2002: Adoption of bioengineered crops. Agricultural economics 
report No. 810. 1800 M street, NW, Washington, DC 20036-5831 
Cragg, J. 1971. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to 
the demand for durable goods. Econometrica 39, 829—844. 
de Janvry A. Murgai, R. and Sadoulet E., 1999. Rural Development and Rural Policy, 
University of California at Berkeley and the World Bank. . 
http://are.berkeley.edu/~sadoulet/papers/Handbook_text.pdf  
de Janvry.A  Key.N  and Sadoulet.E., 1997. Agricultural and Rural Development Policy in 
Latin America. New Directions and New Challenges. FAO Agricultural Policy and 
Economic Development Series – 2- Rome, Italy 
Deaton A. S. and Irish, M. 1984. Statistical Models for zero Expenditures in Household 
Budgets. Journal of Public Economics, 23, p59-80. 
Diagne, A, Zeller,M and  Sharma,M. 2000. Empirical measurements of households’ 
access to credit and credit constraints in developing countries: Methodological 
issues and evidence. Discussion paper No. 90, Food Consumption and Nutrition 
Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, D.C., 
Diagne, A., and Zeller,M. 2001. Access to credit and its impact on welfare in Malawi. 
Research Report No 116.  Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
Diagne A. , Simtowe, F., Chimombo, W. and  Mataya, C. 2000.  Design and Sustainability 
issues of rural credit and savings programs for the poor in Malawi : An Action- 
Oriented Research Project. International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Eswaran, M., and Kotwal,A. 1990. Implications of credit constraints for risk behavior Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 42, No. 2 , pp. 473-482 
Feder, G., Umali D.L., 1993. The Adoption of Agricultural Innovations: A Review, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 43:215-239. 
 27 
Feder,G. Just R.E, and Zilberman, D. 1985. Adoption of agricultural innovations in 
Developing Countries: A Survey. Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol 
33. No 2 
Gilligan, D. Harrower, S., and Quisumbing, A. 2005. How accurate are reports of credit 
constraints? Reconciling theory with respondents`claims in Bukidnon, 
Philippines- IFPRI- Wahington DC 
Government of Malawi. 2004. Agriculture statistics  crop production estimates- Ministry 
of Agriculture and Livestock Development- Malawi 
Martínez Espiñeira R. 2006. A Box-Cox double-hurdle model of wildlife valuation: the 
citizen’s perspective  Ecological Economics 58(1), 192-208 
Moffatt, P. G. 2003. Hurdle models of loan default. School of Economic and Social Studies 
University of East Anglia. Available on-line at 
http://www.crc.ems.ed.ac.uk/conference/presentations/moffat.pdf.  
Simtowe,F. Mduma J, Phiri MAR, Thomas A, and Zeller M. 2006. Can Risk-aversion 
Towards Fertilizer Explain part of the Non-adoption Puzzle for Hybrid Maize? 
Empirical Evidence from Malawi.  Journal of Applied Sciences 6(7)1490-1498 
http://ansijournals.com/jas/2006/1490-1498.pdf  
Smith, M. D. (2003). On dependency in Double-Hurdle models. Statistical Papers 44 (4), 
581—595. 
Van Bastelaer, T. 2000, Imperfect Information, Social Capital, and the Poor's Access to 
Credit, IRIS Center Working Paper No. 234, University of Maryland, Center on 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) 
Vakis.R., de Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., Catero C., 2004. Testing for separability in household 
models with heterogeneous behavior. A mixture model approach. University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Weil, P.M. (1970). The Introduction of the Ox Plow in Central Gambia, Mclaughlin, P.F. 
(Eds.) (1970) African Food Production Systems: Cases and Theory, Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Yen, S. and  Jones. A. 1997. Household consumption of cheese: An inverse hyperbolic sine 
double-hurdle model with dependent errors. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 79, 246—251. 
 28 
Zeller M, Sharma M,  Ahmed Akhter and Rashid S., 2001.  Group –based Financial 
Institutions for the Rural Poor in Bangladesh. An Institutional and Household level 
Analysis. Research Report 120, IFPRI, Washington DC 
Zeller, M., Diagne,A., and Mataya, C., 1998. Market Access by Smallholder farmers in 
Malawi: Implications for technology adoption, agricultural Productivity, and crop 
income. Agricultural Economics, Vol. 19 (2), pp. 219-229 
Zilberman, D., & Just, R. E. 1984. Labor supply uncertainty and technology adoption. In 
R.D . Emerson, (Ed.), Seasonal labor markets in the United States (pp. 200-224). 
Ames: Iowa State University.  
 
A NNEX 1 
Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
Variables Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables     
Whether adopted (1=yes, 0=no) 0.596535 0.491201 0 1 
Percentage of land under hybrid maize 27.35657 27.32174 0 99 
Independent variables     
Yearly off-farm income (MK) 2694.354 7481.599 -28921 77700 
Gender of household head (1=male) 0.722772 0.448185 0 1 
Age of household head(years)   45.13119 13.58404 20 86 
Value of assets owned (MK) 3433.017 8112.252 100 126920 
Household size  4.361386 1.931351 1 12 
Land holding size(ha) 2.175743 1.956425 0 22 
Years of schooling of head 0.759901 0.427673 0 1 
Whether receive free inputs (1=yes) 0.160891 0.430079 0 5 
Tobacco growing household (1=yes) 0.225248 0.418263 0 1 
Distance to Market 6.267327 7.221956 0 23 
Distance to the extension office 2.242574 3.60322 0 15 
Formal credit access (MK/year) 716.7129 1444.45 0 15998 
Informal credit access (MK/year) 176.6856 303.4811 0 2020 
Number of persons per hectare cultivated 3.081683 2.640731 0 16 
Mangochi 0.24505 0.43065 0 1 
Nkhota kota 0.175743 0.381073 0 1 
Rumphi 0.190594 0.393257 0 1 
Dedza 0.252475 0.434971 0 1 
 
